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Unexpected Effects of Expected Sanctions∗
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci†and Alex Raskolnikov‡
December 19, 2020
Abstract
The economic analysis of law enforcement holds that greater expected sanctions lead to
greater compliance. The literature on positive and negative incentives holds that rewards and
sanctions—or carrots and sticks—have identical first-order incentive effects. We extend the basic
model of law enforcement in three ways. We allow agents to opt out of the regulatory regime, we
allow for enforcement errors, and we model agents who vary in at least one trait in addition to
their cost of compliance. We show that following these three realistic modifications of the basic
model, the two fundamental conclusions just described do not hold. Greater expected sanctions
do not necessarily lead to greater compliance; carrots and sticks are not substitutes in their in-
centive effects. We also show that adding taxes and subsidies to the regulatory toolkit does not
expand the set of achievable outcomes.
Keywords: deterrence, chilling, compliance, participation, accuracy, sanctions, rewards, car-
rots, sticks.
JEL codes: K10, K20, K42.
1 Introduction
Gary Becker’s seminal article on the economic analysis of crime (Becker 1968) was not really about
crime. Or at least not only about it. In the article’s first paragraph Becker emphasized that he
would consider not only murder, rape and similar felonies, but also discrimination, collusion,
traffic safety, and “thousands of other activities.” One page later he added tax evasion and white-
collar offenses to the list. And by the time he turned to applications of his model, he quipped
that “crime is apparently not so different analytically from any other activity that produces exter-
nal harm[,] and when crimes are punishable by fines, the analytical differences virtually vanish”
(Becker 1968: 201). Becker’s model had a broad reach indeed.
The theory of optimal deterrence that grew out of Becker’s foundational work embraced his
ambition. That theory is also known as the theory of public enforcement of law (Polinsky and
Shavell 2007)—a name that leaves no doubt that the theory’s goal is to analyze all government
∗We received valuable feedback from Scott Baker, Ryan Bubb, Gerrit De Geest, Ezra Friedman, Abe Wickelgren and
workshop participants at Columbia University, New York University, University of Chicago, University of Texas, and the
annual meetings of ComplianceNet and the American Law and Economics Association. We would also like to thank the
editors and two anonymous referees for very constructive comments. All mistakes are ours.
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regulation. Yet, the theory’s workhorse model serves as an adequate representation of only a
small number of regulatory settings. The model’s key limitation is that it incorporates one choice
facing most regulated parties while largely ignoring another one.
The individual’s decision at the center of the standard deterrence model is whether to comply
with the legal rule or to violate it. Economic analysis of law enforcement has much to say on
how the government can shape this decision. The most fundamental result is that higher expected
sanctions reduce violations and, equivalently, improve compliance.
Yet, compliance and violation are not the only options available to individuals facing most
regulatory regimes. The third option is to avoid participating in the regime altogether. The choice
of whether or not to participate in a regulated activity has received much less attention from law-
and-economics scholars. The analysis of how individuals optimize along the participation and
compliance margins simultaneously is particularly thin.
Becker’s own illustrations reveal the importance of addressing both choices. Consider his first
example: discrimination, say housing discrimination to be concrete. The obvious goal of anti-
discrimination laws is to induce compliance with these laws by landlords. But discrimination
is difficult to define and to prove, so enforcement is never perfectly accurate. Facing a possible
mistaken imposition of liability, some landlords may decide to exit rental real estate business, or
may not enter it in the first place. Importantly, some of these landlords would have run a perfectly
non-discriminatory, socially beneficial business. Their decision to exit or to abstain from entry is a
social cost.
The same analysis applies to collusion, Becker’s second example. It, too, is difficult to define
and to prove. And here, too, a possible mistaken imposition of antitrust liability may induce some
firms to exit concentrated industries where collusion prosecutions are more likely. Turning to
traffic safety, speed limits are sometimes uncertain and are enforced with error (Brabender 2004).
Fearing mistakenly imposed sanctions, some would-be drivers may switch to public transporta-
tion or just stay home. More examples are easily available, and they reveal two challenges faced
by regulators in the vast majority of cases. The first challenge is to ensure compliance with legal
rules by those who participate in a regulated activity. The second challenge is to induce the de-
sired degree of participation in that activity. Ignoring the second challenge necessarily limits the
usefulness of the model.1
The voluminous literature on the use of positive and negative incentives suffers from a similar
failure to incorporate important features of real-world incentive schemes. The economic analysis
of carrots and sticks has established long ago that the two instruments produce identical incentive
effects (Ben Shahar and Bradford 2012). For example, both a subsidy to homeowners using energy
conservation measures and a tax on homeowners who fail to use such measures induce energy
conservation by home owners. In fact, carrots and sticks are so similar that some scholars argue
that the two are actually one and the same (Gordon 1992).2 This does not mean, of course, that
real-world positive and negative incentives are fully interchangeable. Carrots are expensive; sticks
1We recognize that in some settings participation is not optional. As long as one belongs to the society, one is required to
comply with its criminal laws. Even here, however, non-participation is possible. For instance, many white-collar offenses
and many common crimes and misdemeanors do involve both the participation and the compliance decisions (Posner
1985, Raskolnikov 2020).
2Continuing with the energy conservation example, Congress can enact a tax on all homes and then add an offsetting
energy conservation subsidy. Or Congress can enact no uniform home tax but, instead, adopt a tax only on homes that fail
to use energy conservation measures. The first scheme features an energy conservation carrot; the second one features an
energy conservation stick. But either way, owners of energy conserving homes end up neither better nor worse off, and
owners of energy wasting homes end up paying more.
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less so. Carrots induce participation; sticks discourage it (Wittman 1984). Carrots are given to
all eligible claimants; sticks may never apply because individuals may act to avoid them (Dari-
Mattiacci and De Geest 2010). Carrots work better to incentivize complex behaviors; sticks work
well in simple settings (De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci 2013). These are just some of the known
differences. But importantly, all these differences are predicated on the basic, fundamental insight
that in terms of their incentive effects, carrots and sticks are identical. This insight, to the best of
our knowledge, has never been questioned in a realistic setting where individuals have an option
of staying (or opting) out of the regulatory regime altogether.
In this article, we show that the two fundamental results just described do not hold as a general
matter. Higher expected sanctions do not always improve compliance (and, conversely, higher
expected rewards do not always reduce violations), and carrots and sticks do not always have
identical incentive effects. To be clear, the unexpected effect of sticks arise irrespective of the
presence of carrots and the unexpected effects of carrots arise irrespective of the presence of sticks.
Agent heterogeneity and enforcement errors are key to our analysis.3
1.1 An Example and Summary of the Results
To see why higher expected sanctions do not always improve compliance, consider a simple ex-
ample. A principal enforces a regulation by using a sanction (or stick) equal to s = 1 for violators.
The principal’s enforcement is certain (every agent is inspected), but not perfectly accurate; she
correctly assesses violations and compliance with probability q = 34 . Thus, there is a twenty five
percent chance (probability 1− q = 14 ) that the principal mistakenly concludes that a complying
agent violated the rule or that a violating agent complied. Compliance requires agents to exert
effort at a cost, e, that varies across agents.4 Assume that e is uniformly distributed between 0 and
1.
If the agent complies, he bears the cost of compliance plus the expected cost of mistaken penal-
ties, or e + (1− q) s = e + 14 . If the agent violates, he bears the expected cost of correctly imposed
penalties, or qs = 34 . The agent complies if the cost of compliance is less than the cost of viola-
tion, that is, if e < 12 . Given our assumption about the uniform distribution of e, half of all agents
comply.
What if the principal increases the penalty from s = 1 to s = 2? The costs of compliance and
violation become e + 12 and
3
2 , respectively. With a higher expected penalty, an agent complies if
e < 1, meaning that now all agents comply.5 That compliance goes up with the magnitude of the
(expected) sanction is the most fundamental tenet of the law enforcement theory. However, this
fundamental conclusion turns out to hold only if the sole choice faced by the agent is whether
to comply or to violate. If the agent can also choose whether to participate in the regime, the
monotonic relationship between penalties and compliance breaks down.
To see why, let us now consider two subgroups in the population of agents: high-benefit agents,
who derive a benefit bH = 32 from participation, and low-benefit agents who derive a benefit bL =
1
2
from participation. (In both subgroups, e is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 as before.) If
the agent does not participate in the regulated activity, his payoff is equal to 0. By subtracting the
3To be clear, The example in the next section demonstrates both points.
4The effort e can be interpreted as a foregone benefit of violation. In the literature on law enforcement, the benefit of
violating the rule is usually denoted by g and varies among individuals, as e varies in our framework. The two narratives
are interchangeable.
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cost of compliance or violation from the benefit of participation for each subgroup of agents we
obtain the payoffs reported in Table 1.6
Compliance Violation No participation
High-benefit agents 54 − e
3
4 0
Low-benefit agents 14 − e −
1
4 0
Table 1: Payoffs with s = 1.
Among the three available options, each agent chooses the one associated with the highest
payoff. All high-benefit agents participate because the payoff of both compliers and violators is
greater than 0. Thus high-benefit agents choose—as before—between compliance and violation,
and comply if e < 12 .
In contrast, a low-benefit agent earns a negative payoff if he participates and violates the rule.
Hence only those low-benefit agents who would comply if they participated may decide to partic-
ipate. A low-benefit agent’s payoff from compliance is positive if e < 14 . Therefore, only
1
4 of the
low-benefit agents participate and comply, while 34 of them—those with higher cost of participa-
tion e ≥ 14 —do not participate.
What if the principal increases the penalty from s = 1 to s = 2? The parties’ payoffs will change,
and the new payoffs are summarized in Table 2. As before, all high-benefit agents choose to par-
ticipate, but now all of them comply—a higher penalty induces more compliance among these
agents. The standard deterrence result still holds. The response of low-benefit agents is very dif-
ferent, however. Facing a higher penalty, all low-benefit agents choose not to participate. This
change reduces the number of complying agents compared to the low-penalty setting.
Compliance Violation No participation
High-benefit agents 1− e 0 0
Low-benefit agents −e −1 0
Table 2: Payoffs with s = 2.
The reason for these diverging responses is straightforward. An increase in the penalty re-
duces the payoff from violation more than it reduces the payoff from compliance (compare Table
1 with Table 2). This change induces more high-benefit agents to comply, as the deterrence theory
predicts. Low-benefit agents, however, do not compare compliance with violation—they com-
pare compliance with non-participation. The payoff from non-participation is fixed at 0 no matter
what the penalty is, but enforcement errors reduce the payoff from compliance when the penalty
increases. Given this lower payoff, fewer agents choose to participate and comply.
More generally, an increase in the penalty affects the compliance and the participation deci-
sions differently. Depending on the relative proportions of high- and low-benefit agents in the
population, increasing the penalty may lead to an overall reduction, rather than an increase, in the
number of complying agents. In the example, if more than 23 of all agents are low-benefit types,
the decline in the number of compliers in the (relatively large) low-benefit group more than offsets




= 54 − e. The
other payoffs are calculated in an analogous way.
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the increase in the number of compliers in the (relatively small) high-benefit group. Of course, a
higher penalty also decreases the number of violators in the high-benefit group. But the reduction
in compliers may exceed the reduction in violators. If that happens, a familiar policy of increasing
penalties would result in an unfamiliar outcome of reduced compliance.7 Incorporating imperfect
detection into the model does not change these conclusions.
Our second result modifies the long-held view that carrots and sticks have identical incentive
effects. That view has persisted because the rewards-versus-sanctions literature rarely considers
the possibility of avoiding both the sticks and the carrots by staying out of the incentive scheme
altogether. In fact, we believe that scholars have not considered the combined effects of these
complications at all. In reality, however, participation in schemes based on positive incentives is
often optional and imperfect enforcement is widespread.
For example, the energy conservation subsidy for home owners (known as the non-business
energy property tax credit, Internal Revenue Code, sec. 25C) is among many energy-related car-
rots in the Internal Revenue Code (Joint Committee on Taxation 2009). That subsidy is imperfectly
enforced both because some energy saving measures are difficult to observe (for instance, the type
of insulation installed inside house walls) and because the legal definition of qualifying conser-
vation measures is vague (insulation materials and systems qualify if they are “specifically and
primarily designed to reduce the heat loss or gain of a dwelling unit,” Internal Revenue Code, sec.
25C(c)(3)). Improper claiming of credits may be sanctioned (Internal Revenue Code, sec. 6662).
And obviously, home ownership is not mandatory.
We show that when individuals have a choice of avoiding the carrots-and-sticks scheme com-
pletely, changes in the magnitude of carrots and sticks have ambiguous effects on the number of
compliers and violators. The standard result in the literature is that higher carrots increase par-
ticipation in the activity (Wittman 1984). In our model, this result holds. But we show that if the
carrot is large enough, some of the additional participants violate the rule rather than comply with
it, hoping to capture the carrot if the regulator makes a mistake. In fact, it is possible that higher
participation in response to larger carrots comes mostly from violators opting in.
It is easy to see that if we replace a stick with a carrot of the same magnitude in the example
above (that is, change s = 1 to c = 1), the behavior of high-benefit agents does not change. All
these agents still participate and half of them comply.8 In contrast, while no low-benefit agent
finds it advantageous to participate and violate the rule if s = 1,9 half of the low-benefit agents
would choose to participate and violate if c = 1.10 The expected consequence of replacing sticks
with carrots (here, going from s = 1 to c = 1) is increased participation. The unexpected result is
7Denote by h the fraction of high-benefit agents. With the original penalty of s = 1, total number of compliers is 12 h +
1
4 (1− h) =
1+h
4 . With the increased penalty of s = 2, the total number of compliers is equal to h, as only the high-benefit
agents comply and all of them do so. Therefore, increasing the penalty from 1 to 2 reduces the number of compliers if
h < 1+h4 that is, if h <
1
3 and, hence, less than
1




8If c = 1, the payoff of a complying high-benefit agent is equal to bH + qc− e = 32 +
3
4 − e =
9
4 − e, while the payoff of




4 . Comparing the two payoffs, we see that a high-benefit agent
complies if e < 12 and violates if e >
1
2 . This outcome is identical to the high-benefit agents’ decisions with s = 1.
9Recall that with s = 1, 14 of the low-benefit agents choose to participate and comply, while
3
4 of them—those with higher
cost of participation e ≥ 14 —do not participate at all.
10The payoff for a complying low-benefit agent is equal to bL + qc− e = 12 +
3
4 − e =
5
4 − e, while the payoff for a violating




4 . Comparing these two payoffs we see that a low-benefit agent participates
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that most of the additional participants claim carrots improperly.11
Once it is understood that larger sticks may result in fewer compliers and larger carrots may
result in more violators, it becomes clear that the two instruments are not necessarily substitutes,
contrary to what is typically assumed. We demonstrate that carrots and sticks are indeed substi-
tutes in the agents’ choice between compliance and violation. But the two are complements in the
agents’ participation decision. While it is known that sticks deter participation and carrots encour-
age it,12 no attention has been paid to the fact that carrots and sticks also select the type of agents
who choose to participate: whether they are compliers or violators. This selection has an effect on
the overall numbers of compliers and violators and on the compliance rate.
We show that the overall effect of carrots and sticks on the number of compliers and vio-
lators depends on the relative proportions of high-benefit agents—who make the compliance
choice—and low-benefit agents—who make the participation choice—in the population. As is
true for our first unexpected result, admitting a probability of detecting violations below one does
not change this conclusion.
Finally, we show that the effects of carrots and sticks that we identify cannot be changed by in-
troducing taxes and subsidies. A tax amounts to simultaneously increasing the stick and reducing
the carrot by a fixed amount (and vice-versa for a subsidy) without expanding the set of outcomes
that the regulator may achieve. Adding more instruments to the policy mix does not make a dif-
ference in terms of achievable results. To control two margins—the participation and compliance
decisions—it does not help to use more than two instruments—a carrot and a stick.
1.2 Related Literature
Our results relate to a large literature on law enforcement, but we build on a very small number of
key contributions that considered deterrence in the presence of errors and optional participation.
Enforcement errors play an important role in our model. Without errors, compliers would be
indifferent to changes in the stick and violators would be indifferent to changes in the carrot.
Png (1986) was the first to consider the effect of errors in a law enforcement model where agents
made both a compliance and a participation decision. He identified a negative effect of errors on
participation and argued that carrots can be used to complement sticks to counter that effect. 13
Kaplow and Shavell (1994) were the first to formally study the interaction between accuracy
and sanctions in the legal system. Kaplow (2011) introduced chilling in the model of deterrence
with imperfectly accurate law enforcement. Chilling is closely related to the decision of would-be
compliers to abstain from participation in our model. Kaplow (2011) studied how the possibility of
a mistaken imposition of sanctions affects the optimal burden of proof. Friedman and Wickelgren
(2008) showed that the tradeoff between deterrence and chilling may make settlement of legal dis-
putes welfare-reducing. While these contributions provide important foundations for our inquiry,
11Specifically, a change from s = 1 to c = 1 increases the number of participating low-benefit compliers from 14 to
1
2 , while
increasing the number of participating low-benefit violators from zero to 12 . Recall that the behavior of high-benefit agents
does not change.
12This point originates with Wittman (1984). He did not consider, however, the interplay between compliance, violations,
and participation, which is the focus of our analysis.
13Levmore (1986) also considered the joint use of carrots and sticks. He observed that a regulator trying to incentivize
behavior with carrots may need to introduce sticks to prevent false claiming of carrots. That is precisely the problem
we study here. Levmore’s (1986) observation was brief, however. He did not offer a model, and did not analyze any
heterogeneity among the agents as we do.
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none of them considers heterogeneity in the agents’ participation decisions, which is crucial to our
analysis.
More generally, the literature on the economics of law enforcement mostly addresses the ques-
tion of deterrence—that is, the choice between compliance and violation—conditional on partici-
pation. The literature has considered the participation decision in order to determine whether indi-
viduals have incentives to engage in the optimal level of activity in threshold-based (also known as
negligence or fault-based) and strict liability regimes, conditional on individuals complying with
the optimal rule (Polinsky and Shavell 2007: 425). In contrast, we investigate how individuals
choose along both the participation and the compliance margin at the same time.14
A large literature on carrots and sticks mostly views them as interchangeable in their incentive
effects (Gordon 1992, Ben-Shahar and Bradford 2012). Only few contributions stress the differences
between the two, and even these contributions mostly retain the assumption that policymakers
use either carrots or sticks (De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci 2013, Polinsky 1979, Wittman 1984). Au-
thors considering the joint use of carrots and sticks study the effect of the resulting incentives on
a single margin (Andreoni 2003; Ben Shahar and Bradford 2012; Gilpatric 2009; Moldovanu 2012).
In contrast, we study the effect of combining rewards and penalties to affect two separate deci-
sions: whether or not to participate and, conditional on participation, whether or not to comply.
Dari-Mattiacci (2009) investigates how agents make decisions along both of these margins but he
studies the use of a single incentive. Baker and Malani (2019) also consider both margins and show
that type-one and type-two errors have different effects on welfare of third parties relying on the
regulator’s certification of compliance. The regulator in their model can choose the error rate, and
market prices replace sanctions as negative consequences. Kleven and Kopczuk (2011) analyze
government benefits (carrots) jointly with variations in complexity, which they model as costly
increases in enforcement accuracy. They do not include sticks, however, and the cost of greater
accuracy born by agents plays a key role in their model while it is absent from ours.
The plan for the remainder of this article is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our general
model and demonstrate our main results in a simplified version of that model while leaving gen-
eral proofs for the Online Appendix. In Section 3 we show that adding taxes and subsidies adds
nothing to our results. In Section 4 we discuss our assumptions of optional participation, available
carrots, and heterogeneous agents. We also highlight the main analytical and policy payoffs from
our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Model Setup
Consider a principal regulating an activity in which any agent can elect to participate. Each agent
chooses independently whether to participate in the activity and, if so, whether to comply with the
regulation. (Those who do not participate are not subject to the regulation.)15 Agents derive a fixed
14The main concern of the economic analysis of accident law is that it is impossible to incentivize optimal care (that
is, compliance) and optimal activity level (that is, participation) by two parties—the tortfeasor and the victim—through
ordinary liability rules (Shavell 1980). Here we are concerned with the behavior of a single agent in a population of
heterogeneous agents and the main problem is that the policy is not tailored to the agent-specific characteristics. The
literature on torts has paid limited attention to this problem, mainly with respect to heterogeneity in the cost of care
(Ganuza and Gomez 2006).
15In Section 3, we show that our results also apply when the principal directly regulates participation through taxes and
subsidies, which are not conditional on agents’ compliance.
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benefit from participation b > 0 and face a fixed cost of compliance e > 0.16 Costs and benefits vary
across agents, so that the population of agents can be fully described by the probability distribution
F (b, e) of the agents’ two-dimensional types (b, e). Agents are risk neutral and maximize their
expected payoffs.
To induce agents to participate and comply, the principal rewards compliance with a carrot
c > 0 while punishing violations with a stick s > 0.17 However, the principal cannot perfectly
distinguish compliers from violators. The principal correctly identifies compliers with probability
1
2 < qk < 1 and, with the complementary probability 1− qk, the principal erroneously classifies
compliers as violators (a false positive, akin to convicting the innocent). Likewise, the principal
correctly identifies violators with probability 12 < qv < 1 and, with probability 1− qv, the principal
erroneously treats violators as compliers (a false negative, akin to acquitting the guilty).18 The
principal monitors participating agents with probability 0 < p ≤ 1.
2.2 Simplifying Assumptions
To make our points in the starkest possible way, we make a number of simplifying assumptions.
First, we set p = 1, that is, we assume that monitoring takes place with certainty. Second, we
assume that for all agents the cost of compliance e is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.19
Third, we assume that the principal is equally accurate in detecting compliance and violations,
that is
qk = qv = q
and therefore 12 < q < 1. Finally, we assume that the population of agents is divided into two
groups. A portion h of the agents are high-benefit types and they derive a benefit bH from partic-
ipation; the remaining portion 1− h of the agents are low-benefit types and they derive a benefit
bL from participation. For these two groups, we assume that in the baseline case
bH > p (qs− (1− q) c) ≥ bL (1)
This assumption, as will be clarified below, guarantees that in the baseline case all high-benefit
agents choose to participate in the regulated activity while low-benefit agents participate only
if their cost of effort is low enough.20 In the Online Appendix, we relax all these simplifying
16Non-participants earn no benefit and incur no cost. Some activities are costly to the agent; that is, we could allow b
to be negative. Setting a zero lower bound for b, however, is without loss of generality. Allowing for negative benefits for
participants is equivalent to setting a positive benefit for non-participants, which would not affect our results.
17We define carrots and sticks in an unambiguous way: a carrot is a monetary payment from the principal to the agent
conditional on (detected) compliance, while a stick is a monetary payment from the agent to the principal conditional on
(detected) violation. In the Online Appendix we generalize our setup (and hence this definition) to include cases in which
the probability of monitoring, p, is less than 1 and non-monitored agents may receive a carrot or pay a stick so that only
part of the carrot or the stick is conditional on detection.
18Positing that both probabilities are greater than 12 simply restricts attention to the plausible scenarios where the prin-
cipal’s enforcement technology fares better than a coin toss.
19Note that, as a result of this assumption, we impose independence between the distributions of b and e. In the Online
Appendix we will not assume independence between b and e.
20Note that this setup describes a realistic—arguably the only realistic—setting. If the first inequality does not hold, the
benefit of high-benefit agents is so low that they earn a negative payoff from participating and violating the rule. In that
case, all participating agents comply—even in the face of imperfect enforcement. If the second inequality does not hold, the
benefit of low-benefit agents is so high that even non-complying agents participate. In this case, every single agent (both
high- and low-benefit ones) participates—even though participation is not mandatory. Thus, only if both parts of Equation
(1) hold does the model reflect a realistic scenario where some agents participate and comply, some agents participate and
violate, and some agents stay out of the optional, imperfectly enforced regime.
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assumptions, show that the results remain unchanged, and demonstrate some additional results.
(In particular, relaxing the assumption that p = 1, shows that the model is robust to all possible
treatments of non-monitored agents, including settings in which the carrot is paid to all agents
— and disgorged if agents are found violating — and settings in which the carrot is paid only to
monitored agents upon verification of compliance.)
2.3 Analysis
Given the general setup in Section 2.1 and the simplifying assumptions in Section 2.2, an agent of
type (b, e) anticipates the payoffs reported in Table 3.
Action Payoff
The agent participates and complies Πk (b, e) = b + qc− (1− q) s− e
The agent participates but violates Πv (b) = b + (1− q) c− qs
The agent does not participate 0
Table 3: Agent’s payoffs
Starting with the bottom row, if the agent does not participate, his (normalized) payoff is zero.
If he participates but violates the principal’s rule of conduct, the agent earns the benefit b, faces
a stick s with probability q (that is, if the principal correctly qualifies the agent’s conduct as a
violation of the rule), and faces a carrot c with probability 1− q (that is, if the principal erroneously
qualifies the agent’s conduct as compliance). The agent incurs no cost of effort. We denote the
payoff of an agent who participates but violates the rule as Πv (b). Finally, if the agent participates
and complies, he earns the benefit b, faces a carrot with probability q (that is, if the principal
correctly qualifies his conduct as compliance), faces a stick with probability 1− q (that is, if the
principal erroneously qualifies his conduct as a violation), and exerts costly effort. We denote the
payoff of an agent who participates and complies as Πk (b, e).
We can now characterize the agents’ behavior, starting from high-benefit agents. Assuming
that an agent participates, he complies if the payoff from compliance is greater than the payoff
from violation, that is, if Πk (bH , e) > Πv (bH). This is the case if the agent’s cost of effort is lower
than a threshold value that we call the compliance threshold
ek ≡ (c + s) (2q− 1) (2)
Note that, given the agent’s choice between compliance and violation, the payoff of complying
agents must be at least as high as the payoff of violating agents. Therefore, the lowest payoff that
a participating agent may earn is Πv (bH). Given the assumption in Expression (1), the payoff of
high-benefit agents who violate is positive, Πv (bH) > 0, and hence all high-benefit agents partic-
ipate in the activity irrespective of whether they comply or violate. Summing up, a portion ek of
the high-benefit agents participates and complies, while the remaining portion 1− ek participates
and violates.21
Turning to low-benefit agents, note that by the assumption in Expression (1) we have Πv (bL)≤
0, hence not all low-benefit agents participate in the activity. None of the would-be violators and
21This is due to the assumption that e is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, so that the share of agents with e < ek is
exactly ek and, conversely, the share of agents with e ≥ ek is 1− ek .
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some of the would-be compliers stay out. Agents who participate must therefore be compliers and
must earn a positive payoff Πk (bL, e) > 0. This is the case if the agent’s cost of effort is lower than
a threshold value that we call the participation threshold
ep ≡ bL + qc− (1− q) s (3)
To sum up, a portion ep of the low-benefit agents participates and complies, while the remain-
ing portion 1− ep refrains from participation. Figure 1 below offers a visualization of the agents’
behavior in the baseline case when the assumption in Expression (1) holds.
Figure 1: The baseline case (Simulation values: c = s = 12 , q =
3




Having specified the behavior of high- and low-benefit agents, we begin by considering whether
under any conditions our model yields the well-known results from the theory of deterrence and
the economic analysis of carrots and sticks. Unsurprisingly, it does. The basic model of deterrence
rests on the implicit assumption that all agents (must) participate in the regulated activity. In our
simplified model, this approach is equivalent to focusing on the behavior of high-benefit agents
whose choices are controlled by the compliance threshold ek defined in Expression (2). The only
choice that these agents have is between compliance and violation. A change in any enforcement
parameter that reduces the number of violators necessarily increases the number of compliers. An
increase in the stick (sanction) is one such change. Moreover, the compliance threshold ek depends
on the sum of the carrot c and the stick s. So the two are interchangeable in how they affect the
decisions of high-benefit agents. Thus, if we focus only on these agents, expected sanctions do
indeed have expected effects:
1. Compliance and violations are complementary outcomes: an increase in compliance is mir-
rored by a decrease in violations and vice versa.
2. Higher expected sanctions always increase compliance: They increase the number of com-
pliers, reduce the number of violators, and increase the compliance rate—that is, the number
of complying agents over the total number of participants.
3. Carrots and sticks are substitutes: as long as their sum stays constant, any combination of c
and s results in the same level of ek and hence in the same level of compliance and violations.
Considering the behavior of low-benefit agents—in addition to the behavior of high-benefit agents—reveals
the unexpected effects of expected sanctions.
10
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2.4.1 Compliance and Violations are not Complementary Outcomes
Consider our baseline case when the assumption in Expression 1 holds, as illustrated in Figure
1. Focusing on the behavior of low-benefit agents, note that it is controlled by the participation
threshold ep, not the compliance threshold ek. At the margin, low-benefit agents do not choose
between compliance and violation; they choose between compliance and non-participation. So
for these agents compliance and violation are clearly not complementary outcomes. As clearly,
any policy evaluation of a setting similar to our baseline must consider all three possible out-
comes—compliance, violation, and participation.
This discussion highlights a critical ambiguity of the term “compliance.” One possible meaning
of this term is the number of complying agents. Another meaning, however, is the share of comply-
ing agents among all participating agents—compliance as compliance rate. In any setting where
changes in enforcement parameters may change the number of participants, these two meanings
are by no means equivalent. An increase in the number of compliers may coincide with an increase
or a decrease in the rate of compliance, depending on the change in the number of violators. This
complication does not exist in the traditional law enforcement setting where the number of partic-
ipants is fixed. In contrast, in the more general model that we study here, a change in the number
of compliers may lead to a change in both the number of violators and the number of participants.
Compliance and violations are no longer the only two possible, complementary outcomes.
2.4.2 Increasing the Stick May Reduce Compliance
An increase in the stick induces some high-benefit violators to start complying. But a larger stick
also induces some complying low-benefit agents to opt out of the regulated activity. If there are
enough low-benefit agents in the population, the decrease in participation of complying low-
benefit agents will dominate the increase in compliance among high-benefit agents. The am-
biguous effect of sticks on compliance comes from the fact that an increase in sticks affects the
compliance threshold ek and the participation threshold ep in opposite ways.
Formally, if the stick is increased from s to s′ > s and the assumption in (1) remains satis-
fied—that is, if the changes are marginal22—compliance among high-benefit agents increases from
ek = (c + s) (2q− 1) to e′k = (c + s
′) (2q− 1). The increase in the number of compliers in the high-
benefit group is equal to e′k − ek = (s
′ − s) (2q− 1). In contrast, the number of compliers in the
low-benefit group declines from ep = bL + qc − (1− q) s to e′p = bL + qc − (1− q) s′, with a re-
duction equal to ep − e′p = (1− q) (s′ − s). Overall, the number of compliers in the population









22By marginal changes we mean changes in sticks for which the assumption that bH > p (qs′ − (1− q) c) ≥ bL in Expres-
sion (1) continues to hold. This guarantees that the high-benefit agents still fully participate (their payoff line in Figure
1 is completely above 0) and the low-benefit agents participate only if they also comply (their payoff line in Figure 1 is
below 0 for high levels of e). We focus on marginal effects because they generate the interesting ambiguity in the effect of
sticks: they may increase or reduce the number of compliers. This would not be the case if we considered “inter-marginal”
effects. The inter-marginal effect of sticks reveals itself in the possibility that high-benefit agents may decide not to partici-
pate—that is, an increase in s may imply p (qs′ − (1− q) c) ≥ bH > bL—which in turn unambiguously reduces the number
of compliers. Effectively, an increase in the stick that is large enough to violate the assumption in (1) in the direction just
described turns high-benefit agents into low-benefit ones. In the general model in the Online Appendix, both the marginal
effects (on the compliance and participation thresholds) and the inter-marginal effects (on which threshold controls be-
havior) are continuous because we consider a continuum of type. In the simplified model presented in the text above, the
inter-marginal effects are discrete because we only have two types.
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In sum, larger sticks (higher sanctions) clearly reduce the number of violators. However,
larger sticks may also reduce the number of complying agents if the share of low-benefit agents
is large enough. So the first unexpected effect of expected sanctions is that higher sanctions may
reduce—rather than increase—the number of compliers. We show below that greater sanctions
may lead to a lower compliance rate as well. Figure 2 illustrates the effect of doubling the stick
compared to the baseline of Figure 1. This change results in a decrease in the total number of
complying agents if h < 13 , that is if low-benefits agents make up for more than the two thirds of
the population.
(a) High-benefit agents (b) Low-benefit agents
Figure 2: Increased stick (from s = 12 to s
′ = 1, with c = 12 , q =
3
4 , bH = 1, bL =
1
8 ).
2.4.3 Increasing the Carrot May Increase Violations
An increase in carrots induces high-benefit agents to reduce violations, just as an increase in sticks
does. Larger sticks reduce the expected payoff from violations; larger carrots increase the expected
payoff from compliance.24 An increase in carrots, however, may also induce broader participation
by low-benefit agents.
In particular, a larger carrot may induce all25 non-participating low-benefits agents to partic-
ipate, effectively turning them into high-benefit agents, an effect that we call “inter-marginal”.26
Some of these former low-benefit agents will participate and comply; others will participate and
violate. If there are enough low-benefit agents in the population, and if enough of them violate
once they choose to participate, the resulting increase in violators would dominate the reduction
in violators in the high-benefit group.27





24These results follow directly from Expression 2 for the compliance threshold.
25In the Online Appendix, where we allow for a continuous distribution of the benefit b in the population, only some of
the low benefit agents will be induced to fully participate.
26The change is inter-marginal because low-benefit agents go from optimizing along the extensive margin (participation)
to optimizing along the intensive margin (compliance).
27Given our simplifying assumption of only two agent types, such inter-marginal change would lead to an implausible
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Formally, if the increase in the carrot is large enough to violate the assumption in (1),28—that
is, if the increase leads to an inter-marginal change in behavior—all low-benefit agents will partic-
ipate, becoming new high-benefit agents.29 Some of these new participants will violate the rule.
For that group, the number of violators will increase from zero to 1− e′k = 1− (c
′ + s) (2q− 1).
At the same time, a marginal effect of a larger carrot is to decrease violations among the original
high-benefit agents. If the carrot is increased from c to c′ > c, violations in this group decrease
from 1− ek = 1− (c + s) (2q− 1) to 1− e′k = 1− (c
′ + s) (2q− 1). Consequently, the reduction in
violations in the original high-benefit group is equal to e′k − ek = (c
′ − c) (2q− 1). Overall, vio-














Figure 3 illustrates the effect of doubling the carrot as compared to the baseline case depicted in
Figure 1. In this example, the policy results in a increase in violations if h < 12 , that is if low-benefits
agents make up for more than the half of the population.31
2.4.4 Increasing the Carrot or the Stick May Reduce the Compliance Rate
We have shown that increasing the stick may result in fewer compliers and increasing the carrot
may result in more violators. Yet, these effects do not necessarily lead to a lower compliance rate.
Sticks reduce violations, and hence the compliance rate falls only if the reduction in the number of
compliers outweighs the decline in violations. Similarly, carrots increase the number of compliers
and hence the compliance rate falls only if the increase in violations outweighs the increase in the
number of compliers. Therefore, the unexpected effect of sticks or carrots must be large enough
for the compliance rate to fall following an increase in the stick or the carrot. We show here that
this is indeed a possibility.
outcome when all agents participate, even though participation is not mandatory and erroneous sanctions are possible.
In the general model presented in the Online Appendix we consider a continuous distribution of agents’ benefits. In that
realistic case, an inter-marginal change turns some low-benefit agents (those with relatively high benefits) into high-benefit
ones, while other low-benefit agents remain in the low-benefit group.
28That is if c′ if such that bL > qs− (1− q) c′.
29An increase in the carrot may have both marginal and inter-marginal effects, just as an increase in the stick may, as
we pointed out in footnote 22. With sticks, it is the marginal effect that leads to interesting results. With carrots it is the
inter-marginal effect. The marginal effect of higher carrots is the change in behavior within groups: high-benefit agents
react to a larger carrot by complying more and violating less (due to the increase in ek), while low-benefit agents react to a
larger carrot by participating and complying more (due to the increase in ep). These effects are straightforward and do not
yield surprising results. The overall outcome is more compliers and fewer violators. The inter-marginal effect of a larger
carrot is that low-benefit agents may be induced to behave like high-benefit agents—that is, to fully participate. When this
happens, the controlling threshold for low-benefit agents changes from ep—which controls behavior if agents who do not
fully participate—to ek—which controls the behavior of agents who fully participate.





31With the parameter values used in the example in Figure 3 the assumption in (1) is satisfied as an equality, therefore
the example should be interpreted as showing the effect of increasing the carrot from 12 to just above 1. Summing up, the
unexpected effect of sticks is due to the marginal effect of sticks on the participation threshold ep, while the unexpected
effect of carrots arises because some agents who previously reacted to ep start reacting to ek . In the general model discussed
in the Online Appendix, we dispose of our simplifying assumptions and allow marginal and inter-marginal effects to play
out simultaneously. Our results remain unchanged and the logic governing the general results is the same as explained
here.
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(a) High-benefit agents (b) Low-benefit agents
Figure 3: Increased carrot (from c = 12 to c
′ = 1 , with s = 12 , q =
3
4 , bH = 1, bL =
1
8 ).
In the baseline case, the compliance rate is equal to hek+(1−h)eph+(1−h)ep , where the numerator is the
total number of compliers in each group—that is, ek for the high-benefit agents and ep for the low-
benefit agents—multiplied by the size of the relevant group—that is, h and 1− h, respectively. The
denominator is similarly the total number of participants in each group—that is, 1 for the high-
benefit agents and ep for the low-benefit agents—multiplied by the size of the relevant group—that
is, again, h and 1− h, respectively. We need to compare this baseline compliance rate with the
compliance rate that obtains after increasing the stick or the carrot.
We start with carrots. Increasing the carrot to c′ > c results in a compliance rate equal to e′k > ek
because, as we have observed above, now all agents fully participate and choose to comply if
e < e′k. Therefore, the compliance rate is the number of compliers, e
′
k, over the total size of the
population, which is 1. The compliance rate falls as a result of the increase in the carrot if e′k <
hek+(1−h)ep










+ e′k − ek
(4)
In the example underlying Figures 1 and 3, we have ek = 12 , ep =
3





these values in (4), we have the following condition: h < 311 . Therefore, in the example, if h <
3
11
increasing the carrot results in an increase in violations and a decrease in the compliance rate.
Note that if 311 < h <
1
2 , increasing the carrot results in an increase in violations and an increase
(rather than a decrease) in the compliance rate. This is because, the increase in violations in the
low-benefit group is more than compensated by an increase in the number of compliers in both
groups in this case. Finally, if h > 12 , violations decrease and the compliance rate increases with
larger carrots.
We can now turn to sticks. The logic is similar, while the analysis is slightly more involved. As
we have shown, increasing the stick from s to s′ results in an increase in the compliance threshold
from ek to e′k and a decrease in the participation threshold from ep to e
′
p. The compliance rate


















− e′p (1− ek) + e′k − ek
(5)
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> e′p (1− ek), which is not the case in our running example.32 This shows that larger
sticks may result in fewer compliers and yet not in a decrease in the compliance rate. Changing
the example slightly reveals the case where an increase in the stick leads to both fewer compliers
and a lower compliance rate. In this case, higher sanctions harm compliance in both senses of that
term.33
2.4.5 Carrots and Sticks are not (Perfect) Substitutes
The analysis in the previous two sections makes it clear that carrots and sticks are not perfect sub-
stitutes in our setting. The two instruments are indeed substitutes for high-benefit agents making a
marginal choice between complying and violating, as is clear from Expression 2 for the compliance
threshold. Both larger carrots and larger sticks reduce violations in that group. In contrast, carrots
and sticks are complements for low-benefit agents making a marginal choice between complying
and abstaining from participation, as is clear from Expression 3 for the participation threshold.
Larger carrots induce participation while large sticks depress it for that group.
Moreover, inter-marginal changes are also possible. With respect to those, carrots and sticks are
complements. A sufficiently large increase in the stick or a sufficiently large decline in the carrot
turns high-benefit agents into low-benefit ones, causing former high-benefit violators to opt out of
the regime. Vice versa, a sufficiently large decline in the stick or a sufficiently large increase in the
carrot turns low-benefit agents into high-benefit ones, causing former low-benefit non-participants
to participate and violate the rule.
Overall, an increase in carrots and an increase in sticks will typically results in different out-
comes. More starkly, they may result in the opposite outcomes. While increasing the carrot un-
ambiguously leads to more compliers, increasing the stick may result in fewer of them. Similarly,
while an increase in the stick reduces the number of violators, an increase in the carrot may in-
crease that number. So the second unexpected effect of expected sanctions (or sticks) is that they
are not substitutes for expected rewards (or carrots) in their incentive effects, as is commonly as-
sumed.
3 Taxes and Subsidies
Let us now examine whether adding a tax to the model expands the set of outcomes that the
principal can reach. Assume that that the principal perfectly observes participation and non-
participation. Assume further that the principal taxes non-participation in the activity by a fixed
amount τ. Obviously, and in contrast with the carrot and the stick in our model, this tax does not
depend on the compliance decisions of participating agents. Alternatively, the principal subsidizes
the regulated activity (again, regardless of the principal’s findings of compliance or violation) by









33Start with a different carrot, c = 14 , and increase the stick from s =
1
2 to s
′ = 1 as we did before (and retain q = 34 ). This










16 . Plugging these values in (5), we
have that if h < 19 , both the number of compliers and the compliance rate fall as a result of increasing the stick, yielding
the result described in the text. If 19 < h <
1
3 the number of compliers falls but the compliance rate increases if the stick is
increased, owing to the lower number of violators. Finally, if h > 13 increasing the stick has the expected effect of improving
both compliance and the compliance rate.
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the same amount τ. (If τ is negative we have a tax for participants or, equivalently, a subsidy for
non-participants.) The new payoff matrix is as follows:
Action Payoff
The agent participates and complies Πk (b, e) = b + qc− (1− q) s− e + τ
The agent participates but violates Πv (b) = b + (1− q) c− qs + τ
The agent does not participate 0
Table 4: Agent’s payoffs
We have now the following thresholds:
eτk = (c + s) (2q− 1)
eτp = bL + qc− (1− q) s + τ
Clearly the compliance threshold is unaffected by τ, because every participant receives τ whether
he complies or not. In contrast, participation is incentivized by τ, both for compliers and for vio-
lators, given that eτp increases in τ.
The addition of τ, however, does not expand the set of outcomes that the principal can reach.
To see why, consider that the principal could replicate the same compliance and participation
thresholds as above by simply adjusting the carrot and the stick instead of implementing a tax or
a subsidy. Specifically, the principal could increase the carrot by an amount equal to τ and reduce
the stick by the same amount; that is, the principal could set c
′
= c + τ and s
′
= s− τ to mimic the




= c + s. The
participation threshold is also met because we have
ep = bL + qc
′ − (1− q) s′
= bL + q (c + τ)− (1− q) (s− τ)
= bL + qc− (1− q) s + τ = eτp
In essence, the principal can replicate the effects of taxes and subsidies by keeping the sum of
the carrot and the stick constant (so as to keep the compliance threshold constant) while altering
their ratio cs . That ratio should increase if the activity is subsidized (that is, if τ is positive) and
decrease if the activity is taxed (that is, if τ is negative).34
The conclusion that adding taxes or subsidies offers no benefit to the regulator seemingly con-
tradicts the classic result in the economic analysis of tort law: Because no liability rule can assure
both the optimal level of care (compliance) and activity (participation), taxing or subsidizing the
activity improves the regulator’s ability to control the agent’s behavior along both margins at the
same time (Png 1986). The reason for this improvement is that the regulator in the tort model has
only one instrument—damages—to control both the care and the activity levels. A tax or a subsidy
amounts to a second instrument at the regulator’s disposal. In contrast, our model features two
instruments—the carrot and the stick. These two instruments are all the regulator needs in order
to control two behavioral margins. Adding more instruments does not improve the results.35
34This simple transformation rule works in the simplified model and is a special case of a more general transformation
rule presented in the Online Appendix.
35Carrots and sticks have opposite effects on participation. Since the compliance margin depends on their sum, they can
be adjusted to vary participation as desired without affecting compliance.
16
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3766707
4 Discussion
Our results modify some long-held views about the basic workings of deterrence mechanisms and
the interplay between positive and negative incentives. Yet our analysis hews closely to Becker’s
(1968) canonical model. We modify that model in only three ways. First, we add the participation
margin to the analysis of compliance. Second, we add carrots to the law enforcement setting.36
And third, we introduce agents who differ in at least one dimension in addition to their varying
costs of complying with the law. In this section, we explain that our modifications are neither
minor nor artificial. Rather, they make the law enforcement model more realistic and more useful
to real-world regulators. We also alert regulators to the conditions that may lead to unintended
effects of familiar regulatory incentives. Finally, we reflect on the normative implications of the
ambiguities that we have identified in this article.
4.1 Optional Participation
Consider some of the canonical examples of socially costly acts in the law and economics litera-
ture: pollution (Coase 1960, Calabresi and Melamed 1972), collusion and monopolies (Becker 1968,
Stigler 1970, Tullock 1967), speeding (Becker 1968, Stigler 1970), theft (Becker 1968, Calabresi and
Melamed 1972, Tullock 1967), and tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). All these acts (and
many others) raise the question of deterring socially harmful conduct—the question which gave
rise to the deterrence theory itself.
But all of the same examples also raise the question of participation in the named activity. A
firm potentially liable for pollution may exit the “dirty” industry; a firm potentially liable for collu-
sion may exit the concentrated sector of the economy; a driver potentially liable for speeding may
stay home or get on a bicycle; a diner afraid of being charged with theft after mistakenly taking
someone else’s umbrella on the way out may stay clear of restaurants on rainy days, a taxpayer
concerned with sanctions for non-compliance may avoid transactions, structures, and financial
instruments with uncertain tax consequences. It is not an overstatement to say that regulatory
settings where opting out of the regime is impossible are the exception, not the rule.
Moreover, legal uncertainty and enforcement errors are hardly uncommon in all of the areas
just mentioned (and in many others). Environmental laws are often vague (Sackett v. EPA, 132 S.Ct.
1367, 1375 (Alito, J., concurring)), determinants of collusion are “difficult to articulate” (Kaplow
2012b: 479), liability for theft and many other theft-like activities turns on the defendant’s (unob-
servable) state of mind (Raskolnikov 2014), and one hardly needs to elaborate on the complexity
and uncertainty of the tax law. Mistaken imposition of liability is far from a remote possibility in
these and many other legal regimes. Given this concern, opting out is a real choice even for agents
who would have complied with the law if they participated. A model that ignores this choice
necessarily has only a limited explanatory power when applied to the real world.
In fact, the limitation of such a model is even more significant than the examples offered thus
far suggest. All these examples involve potentially harmful acts that yield private benefits in ex-
cess of private costs. There is, however, another category of acts—those producing private benefits
that are too small (compared to private costs) to induce individuals to act. If the government wants
these acts to occur—perhaps because they produce positive externalities—the government needs
to offer positive incentives to induce individuals to participate in these socially beneficial activities.
36As we stressed in note 3 and accompanying text, the co-existence of carrots and sticks in only crucial to our comparative
results but not to the results on the effects of carrots and sticks taken in isolation.
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When regulating these acts, inducing participation is the institutional designer’s main objective,
not an afterthought. Overall then, fully incorporating the participation decision into the canonical
model of deterrence is essential to improving the model’s realism and usefulness.
4.2 Carrots, not Just Sticks
The traditional analysis of law enforcement instructs the government to deter privately beneficial
but socially costly acts by imposing sanctions equal to the acts’ expected external harms. Thus
the key analytical variables are the private benefit, the external harm, and the expected sanction.
Positive incentives appear to have no role in this setup. Png (1986) suggested that carrots should
be used to counter the erroneous imposition of sticks on complying agents. But Png’s (1986) brief
analysis considered a highly simplified setting, his application was unrealistic,37 and his insight
has remained undeveloped.
A voluminous literature on carrots and sticks certainly does investigate the effects of rewards in
optional incentive schemes. But that literature generally does not address the problem of improper
(illegal) claiming of carrots. Taken together, the deterrence scholarship focuses on sticks and en-
forcement errors while mostly ignoring carrots, and the literature on carrots and sticks mostly
ignores imperfect enforcement. Yet a moment’s reflection leads to two conclusions. First, op-
tional incentive-based regimes do raise noncompliance concerns. Second, traditional enforcement
settings studied in the deterrence literature do feature carrots, though usually of an unintended,
quasi-carrot variety.
Starting with the optional, incentive-based regime, note that the US government spends mul-
tiple billions each year on cash grants (Goodwin and Smith 2018; Theodos, Stacy and Ho 2017),
loan assistance (Goodwin and Smith 2018), price and revenue protection programs (Glauber 2018;
Sumner 2018), insurance subsidies (Glauber 2018; Sumner 2018), and other carrots designed to
induce participation in a wide variety of government schemes aimed at anything from peanut
farming (Goodwin and Smith 2018) to community development (Theodos, Stacy and Ho 2017)
to workplace diversity (Sturm 2006). Small businesses alone benefit from fifty-two different fed-
eral assistance programs administered by the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Housing
and Urban Development, and the Small Business Administration (US Government Accountability
Office 2012). US states spend billions more on similar inducements (Patrick 2014).
Some of the carrot-granting programs challenge the recipients (and the regulators) with “a
complicated labyrinth of criteria,” making enforcement errors all but certain (Howells 1970: 393-
94, 412). Some carrot-claimers skirt the rules, failing to comply either with their letter or their spirit
(Goodwin and Smith 2018; Howells 1997; Theodos, Stacy and Ho 2017). In response, regulators
use penalties to deter improper carrot-claiming (Howells 1997). Thus simultaneous presence of
carrots, sticks, and enforcement errors is a typical feature of many US incentive programs, not an
aberration.
The US government also spends billions more in positive incentives outside of the federal bud-
get. The so-called tax expenditures—special tax breaks in the Internal Revenue Code designed to
induce participation in a particular activity—offer potential participants a carrot just like outright
cash grants do (US Government Accountability Office 2013). 38In fact, three of the largest corpo-
37Png suggested a carrot in the form of payments to all drivers involved in accidents, whether they exercise due care or
not, Png (1986: 103).
38Note that for the largest eight hundred or so companies under a continuous IRS audit (Elliott 2012), the only uncertainty
surrounding the carrot arises from inaccurate enforcement by the government auditors that is key to our model. In other
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rate tax expenditures of the recent past—the deduction for accelerated depreciation, the domestic
production activities deduction (repealed at the end of 2017), and the research and development
(R&D) tax credit—illustrate every feature of our model (US Government Accountability Office
2013). The R&D credit, to take one example, is a carrot. Its false claiming is punished with a
tax-penalty stick. The rules determining a taxpayer’s eligibility for the tax credit are complex and
uncertain, so enforcement errors are inevitable. Thus both the participation and the compliance
decisions are in play.
Two further insights highlight the wide applicability of our results. First, the carrot need not
take the form of a payment or a reduction in a price or a tax burden. Any government-created
benefit is a carrot in terms of our model. Second, the carrot need not be intended as such by the
regulator.
Consider the Federal Reserve’s so-called discount window that offers eligible banks access to
short-term liquidity under certain conditions. The discount window was put in place in 1913 to
establish the Federal Reserve as the lender of last resort, and possibly to incentivize small-business
lending by local banks (Hunt 2014). It was certainly not created to incentivize trading firms to
become banks. Yet, this was exactly how it worked when Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs
chose to become banks in the midst of the financial crisis (Sorkin and Bajaj 2008). The discount
window amounted to an unintended quasi-carrot.
The Volcker Rule enacted in the aftermath of the crisis in order to stop proprietary trading by
deposit-taking institutions completed the picture. The discount window is a quasi-carrot. The
broad enforcement powers of the Fed are a stick (Hamilton 2017). And the purpose-based defini-
tion of proprietary trading, as well as the hedging and market-making exceptions, in the Volcker
Rule inevitably give rise to false positives and false negatives (Bubb and Kahan 2018). The overall
incentive structure is exactly the one we model.
Tax quasi-carrots are the focus of much day-to-day corporate tax planning. The tax-free re-
organization provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, to take one example, were not enacted to
induce tax-free reorganizations. Rather, Congress decided that if a corporate enterprise continues
in a different form but with little change, there is no reason to impose the tax.39 Yet there is no
doubt that massive tax savings from securing a tax-free treatment for corporate acquisitions and
separations are of first-order significance in momentous business decisions that shape financial
markets and the US economy (Elliott 2015). And conditioning the tax-free treatment on whether
transactions take place pursuant to a “plan,” whether “substantially all” of the assets are trans-
ferred, and whether the entire reorganization has “economic substance,” along with other vague
tests, makes it quite clear that the application of tax-free provisions involves plenty of uncertainty.
Likewise, Congress enacted international tax rules—including the foreign tax credit provi-
sions—to enable source-based taxation of income earned by US companies abroad without double-
taxing that income (Graetz and O’Hear 1997). The goal was not to induce US companies to move
their operations or corporate domicile offshore. In fact, the major reform of the US international
tax regime in 2017 was motivated by the desire to prevent these very shifts, including the so-called
corporate inversions. Yet, it is beyond doubt that foreign tax credits do serve as a quasi-carrot—an
unintended inducement to move operations, headquarters, and income offshore. At the same
words, p = 1 in this case as in the simplified model presented in the text.
39In the words of the leading treatise, these provisions were put in place under “the assumption [...] that the new
enterprise [...] that may hold the corporate assets, and the new stock or securities received in exchange for old stock or
securities, are substantially continuations of, and interests in, the old corporations, still alive but in different form” (Bittker,
Eustice, and Goldstein 2015, Par.12.00[1]).
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time, the complexity of US international tax rules makes it impossible to enforce them error-free.
Overall, carrots are pervasive. Numerous regulatory regimes are designed around positive
incentives. Many more feature quasi-carrots that were not put in place to incentivize a particular
activity but that do so just the same. An economic analysis of regulation that ignores carrots is of
limited practical use indeed.
4.3 Heterogeneous Agents
Our last modification of the standard deterrence model is the introduction of agents who vary
along a dimension other than their cost of compliance. Thus far, that dimension was the agents’
private benefit from participation. One hardly needs to spend much time to defend this assump-
tion. In fact, the opposite assumption would be wildly unrealistic. Different polluting plants do
not derive the same benefits from running their operations or from installing identical pollution
control devices. Drivers do not benefit equally from getting to their destinations. Reorganizing
firms—even while undertaking the same type of a tax-free reorganization—do not capture identi-
cal gains from their business combinations. Private benefits are, indeed, heterogeneous.
But heterogeneity of benefits is just one possible dimension of additional heterogeneity. As
we show in the Online Appendix, our results hold in a setting in which all agents derive the
same benefit from participation but hold different beliefs about the enforcement accuracy qk and
qv. Agents’ beliefs may vary for at least two reasons. First, the principal may not be equally
accurate in evaluating compliance of different agents. Second, whatever the principal believes
about her own accuracy, it is difficult for the principal to convey this belief to the agents, and
all but impossible to do so credibly. We do not assert that agents have no information about the
matter. Litigation, published official interpretations, and informal guidance all provide agents
with valuable information. But it is implausible to assume that this information leads all agents to
arrive at the same conclusion regarding the government’s enforcement error rates.
The two dimensions of additional heterogeneity that we model (additional, that is, to the varia-
tion in the compliance costs) are just the tip of the iceberg. Any idiosyncratic characteristic that af-
fects an agent’s participation decision will have similar effects to those revealed in our model. One
important source of heterogeneity could be variation in the agents’ private experiences with the
nominally uniform policy variables. Punishments, to take one example, are often non-monetary,
and the same punishment may be felt differently by different agents (Galle and Mungan 2019).
Suspension of a driving license, for instance, may impact rich and poor agents differently. Even
monetary fines may have harsher effects on liquidity-strapped agents. If so, a portion of the pop-
ulation may effectively face high sticks, while the remaining fraction faces low sticks, even though
the nominal sanction is the same for everyone. Similar results obtain when agents experience the
carrot differently. All such differing experiences would generate results analogous to ours.40
In addition to having different private realizations of uniform carrots and sticks, agents may
differ in their perceptions of the variables we consider. Identical carrots and sticks may have
different salience for different agents. Different agents may fall victims to well-known probability
misperceptions to a different extent (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Williams 2014). Any sanction or
reward that is not immediate would have a different present value for agents with varying private
discount rates (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2004). In fact, a variation related to
40Each different source of heterogeneity may in fact generate different specific results, but our central contention—that
the participation decision is affected by changes in policy variables in a way that interacts with the decision to comply or
violate—would remain valid.
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almost any bias identified in the behavioral economics literature is likely to produce heterogeneity
that would give rise to our results.
In reality, it is almost certainly true that people and firms subject to the kinds of regulation that
we model here vary along many different dimensions at the same time. We do not model such
multi-dimensional heterogeneity. But our results make it clear that the canonical conclusions that
we question here are even less likely to be true in a complex regulatory environment with agents
varying along multiple dimensions in different ways.
4.4 Implications
Our analysis does not produce simple and easily testable insights; it undermines the existing ones.
We show that a simple compliance-enhancing effect of expected sanctions does not generally hold,
and neither does a simple relationship between the incentives produced by carrots and sticks.
Negative results are informative, but our inquiry has positive implications as well—both practical
and conceptual ones.
On the practical side, the crucial payoff of our analysis is to alert real-world regulators about
settings where they ought to be especially concerned about the unexpected effects of familiar en-
forcement instruments. When regulators focus on enforcement—of competition law, environmen-
tal law, discrimination law, tax law, and many other regulatory settings—they should ask them-
selves whether regulated parties are likely to consider exiting (or not entering) the regulatory
regime. Is it likely that imperfectly administered sanctions for housing discrimination would lead
potential compliant landlords to invest in other assets? Is it likely that sanctions for tax noncompli-
ance would drive taxpayers away from particular business transactions or securities? Of course,
regulators will never know answers to these questions perfectly. But just asking the question
would be a step forward compared to the sole focus on the magnitude of statutory penalties and
the probability of detection.
Regulators have long-known that increasing expected sanctions may reduce participation in
an optional regime. We show that the same increase may lead to an outcome that, we believe,
most regulators would view as much more problematic than lower participation: it may reduce
compliance. This in turn calls for monitoring the consequences of an increase in expected sanctions
with greater vigilance.
Turning to regimes based on positive incentives or rewards, regulators need to pay close at-
tention both to the possible noncompliance and to the possible exit. If a regulator interested in
energy conservation by home owners can perfectly observe whether an owner claiming to engage
in such conservation actually does so—and if everyone owns a home—the regulator can safely
assume that a carrot (such as the tax credit) for energy-saving homes and a stick (such as a tax) on
energy-wasting homes would produce identical incentives to convert energy-wasting homes into
energy-saving ones. The regulator may increase the carrot, or the stick, or both; only the sum of
the two instruments would matter in terms of the magnitude of the incentive.
But if the regulator cannot perfectly observe the appropriateness (legality) of claiming the car-
rot, if the regulator uses the stick to punish those who claim the carrot inappropriately, and if home
owners may exit the entire energy saving regime by switching to rentals, the regulator better be
careful. Relying on the tried-and-true assumption that carrots and sticks are interchangeable may
lead to unexpected and highly objectionable outcomes. A larger carrot may lead to many individ-
uals buying homes and claiming the generous carrot illegally—an undesirable result that a larger
stick would not produce.
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Recognizing this problematic effect of carrots is particularly important because the pairing of
carrots with sticks is not always deliberate or easily seen by the regulator. Returning to the housing
discrimination example, US law has long-offered tax incentives to induce landlords to invest in
low-income housing (Congressional Research Service 2019). Congress recently enacted another
tax incentive program—the Opportunity Zone tax credit—that may also subsidize construction
of rental housing in economically disadvantaged areas (Tax Policy Center 2018). Needless to say,
Congress enacted these incentive programs not to subsidize discriminatory low-income housing.
But our findings show that regulators must be vigilant to make sure that greater housing incentives
do not lead to this very result.
Another and particularly important example of the relevance of our findings comes from the
largest US means-tested transfer program for low-income workers. This program—the earned
income tax credit (EITC)—offers refundable credits to workers meeting the program’s eligibility
requirements. In 2015, the EITC disbursed over sixty billion dollars to more than twenty five
million workers (Crandall-Hollick 2018: 6). Unfortunately, some of the eligibility requirements are
complex, making compliance costly and enforcement errors likely.41 As a result, about a fifth of
eligible workers are estimated to fail to claim EITC (Goldin 2018). Among those who do claim,
noncompliance is a significant problem.42 Thus, the participation and compliance challenges are
readily apparent.
Congress and the IRS have long recognized these dual challenges, so it is useful to consider
regulatory responses. Dissatisfied with significant noncompliance, Congress followed the stan-
dard deterrence prescription and raised expected penalties for inappropriate claiming of the EITC
in 1997, 1998, 2002 (Brown 2007: 806-07), and 2015 (Chen and Nellen 2017). But at the same
time—and despite its concerns about significant noncompliance—Congress made EITC more gen-
erous in 1990, 1993, 2001, 2009, and 2015 (Crandall-Hollick 2018). Thus, Congress increased both
carrots and sticks over time while facing both the compliance and the participation challenges.
We do not suggest that over the past several decades, multiple sessions of Congress and IRS
administrations changed EITC sticks and carrots following the logic of our findings. This would
be naïve as a political economy matter, and as an economic hypothesis as well. We predict that
raising sanctions may reduce the number of compliers and the compliance rate in an optional
participation regime like the EITC. But the number of compliers and the compliance rate are im-
possible to measure precisely, and the total number of eligible participants is at best an educated
guess (Goldin 2018). Measuring changes in these outcomes in response to changes in sanctions
and rewards is even more difficult. It is worth remembering that even the most basic predictions
of the deterrence model—that higher sanctions and detection probabilities increase deterrence in
mandatory regimes—are by no means undisputed as an empirical matter or as a policy prescrip-
tion (Raskolnikov 2020, Tonry 2008). Our results are more subtle and more difficult to prove em-
pirically than these standard prescriptions are. These results are also new to the literature. So we
do not want to overstate their connection to prior policies. We do believe, however, that the his-
tory of EITC reforms shows clearly that policymakers recognize that focusing on deterrence and
41The costs arise because in order to comply with relevant requirements a taxpayer needs to exert effort to understand
the rules and to keep records throughout the year (Goldin 2018:77-78). In contrast, a violator may essentially assert that he
or she meets the requirements without incurring these costs. The idea that tax underpayment may result from taxpayers’
failure to exert effort in order to understand the rules is not new to the tax compliance literature (DeBacker et al. 2018). As
for enforcement errors, IRS data show that in 2011 the tax agency improperly penalized EITC recipients 40% of the time
(National Taxpayer Advocate 2013).
42The EITC rate of improper payments ranged between 20% and 30% since 2003—significantly greater than the average
overall noncompliance rate of about 17% (Drumbl 2016).
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expected sanctions while ignoring the participation margin is a poor way of regulating optional
participation regimes. Our findings not only support this intuition, but inform it as well.
The final implication of our analysis is to highlight the fundamental ambiguity of the common
regulatory objective of increasing “compliance.” In a typically studied enforcement setting where
participation is mandatory or otherwise universal, reducing the number of violators necessarily
means increasing the number of compliers. Moreover, because the number of participants is fixed
(everyone participates), increasing the number of compliers is equivalent to increasing the compli-
ance rate. Given these relationships, it is no surprise that the deterrence literature treats reducing
violations as unquestionably desirable. The only question is how best to achieve this reduction at
the least social cost.
But when participation is neither mandatory nor universal—that is, in the vast majority of real-
world regulatory schemes—a reduction in the number of violators is not longer unambiguously
desirable. Once this is understood, new normative questions immediately arise.
If a regulatory intervention reduces the number of violators while also reducing the number
of compliers even more, is the intervention worthwhile? Even in purely descriptive terms, if the
number of violators declines but the compliance rate declines as well, has compliance improved or
deteriorated? Similarly, if the number of compliers goes up, but the number of violators increases
even more so that the compliance rate declines, should we think of the result as greater compliance
or greater noncompliance? And in any case, is the result socially desirable?
These questions are beyond this article’s scope. In fact, they open a new research agenda
in the study of optimal deterrence and regulatory compliance. This article’s contribution is to
dislodge the accepted views about the relationships between compliance and violations as well
as between carrots and sticks. Once these views are shown to be incorrect in many real-world
legal regimes, scholars may begin the search for new answers to questions about the meaning of
compliance—questions that until now seemed long-settled.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we identify some unexpected effects of familiar regulatory instruments. The deter-
rence theory holds that higher expected sanctions lead to fewer violations and greater compliance.
We agree with the first part of this statement but not the with the second one. When agents choose
both whether or not to comply and whether or not to participate in an imperfectly enforced regula-
tory scheme, higher expected sanctions may lead to both fewer compliers and a lower compliance
rate. The literature on carrots and sticks holds that the two instruments create identical incentives
and vary only in their second-order effects. We show that if improper claiming of carrots is possi-
ble and if the regulator cannot deter it by sanctioning violators with perfect accuracy, the incentive
effects of carrots and sticks are not the same.
Inevitably, our analysis has limitations. We discuss six of them here. The first limitation reflects
a well-known and persistent challenge to the economic analysis of law. Agents in our model
cannot affect the principal’s accuracy by adjusting their behavior. Agents either comply or violate;
they cannot barely cross the line or engage in egregious noncompliance. This assumption is more
realistic in some settings than in others.
The assumption of agents’ binary behavior is standard in law-and-economics. The reason for
it is well-known: eliminating this assumption leads to indeterminate results (Craswell and Calfee
1986; Shavell 1987). Several recent contributions show that in certain settings this indeterminacy
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disappears (Baker and Raskolnikov 2017; Dari-Mattiacci 2005). Our analysis does not contribute
to further resolving this long-standing challenge.
The second limitation is our principal’s inability to tailor its instruments to individual agents.
This inability is one of the key distinctions between a constrained model like ours and the mecha-
nism design literature. In reality, regulators usually deploy crude, uniform instruments rather than
individually-tailored incentives (Kaplow 2017: 4-5, Montero 2005, Stavins 2003). So our assump-
tion of uniform carrots, sticks, and the likelihood of detection is quite realistic in many settings.
Third, participants in our model can choose to participate or not, but they cannot choose the
extent of participation. Incorporating this variable into the model would necessarily complicate
it. Our goal is to show that extending the standard model to reflect a small number of realistic
features is sufficient to modify the canonical conclusions of the deterrence theory and the literature
on carrots and sticks.
Fourth, we do not model costs of various regulatory tools that we consider. These costs are
likely to vary. Carrots are usually more expensive for the principal than sticks are. Increasing
the rate of monitoring may consume more of the principal’s resources than adjusting a monetary
sanction. Our contribution is to clarify the effects of changing different enforcement instruments,
leaving it to the principals (and to future work) to balance these effects against related costs and
benefits.
Fifth, and at the risk of stating the obvious, our model is a simplified version of reality. Not
only agents’ benefits and principal’s accuracy vary simultaneously in real-world settings, other
factors such as risk aversion, uncertainty aversion, various heuristics and biases, as well as non-
monotonic responses to incentives (Gneezy and Rustichini 2004) likely come into play. Our de-
cision not to model all these complications is deliberate. We re-examine the foundational conclu-
sions of canonical models, and we show that these conclusions do not generally hold even without
accounting for risk aversion, behavioral factors, or other deviations from rationality. Extending the
model to incorporate such deviations is likely to raise further questions about the general applica-
bility of the model’s basic payoffs.
Finally, we offer a positive theory of behavior, not a normative theory of optimal regulation. We
do not specify the social welfare function and do not discuss efficiency. While the choice to limit
the model in this way differs from most of the deterrence scholarship, our choice is deliberate. The
main message of our analysis is that the canonical findings of the deterrence theory are, in essence,
misleadingly simple even on the positive side. We believe that the shortcomings of the deterrence
theory on the normative side are even more substantial.
The standard normative framework of the optimal deterrence model consists of an activity
that produces an external harm, and a regulator who aims to force the agent producing this harm
to internalize it at the lowest cost to the regulator. The negative externality is the only cause of
inefficiency and the only motivation for government action. This framework is not particularly
realistic, especially in the numerous optional-participation regimes that we study. Where carrots
are present by design, the government obviously aims to induce some agents to participate. There
must be some social benefit of this participation or social cost of non-participation. The benefit
or cost must vary among the agents (or the government would issue a mandate rather than an
inducement). Moreover, as soon as carrots enter the picture, one needs to consider the source of
the funds and the deadweight loss of raising them. There has been very little effort to extend the
basic external harm model to account for any of these additional social costs and benefits. Making
progress here would not be easy, and we leave an effort to make such progress for the future.
Another reason not to commit to any specific welfare function is that doing so would limit one
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of this article’s main takeaways. We offer a positive theory of agents’ behavior that shows that the
fundamental tenets of the law enforcement scholarship and the literature on positive and negative
incentives do not hold in general, and perhaps not even in most cases. These results are valid
given any welfare function—an important point given the complexity of the welfare analysis and
the controversy surrounding it.
In the end, our unexpected findings—as well as all of the limitations just discussed—sound a
note of caution for real-world regulators. Rather than relying on the seemingly straightforward
prescriptions of the basic deterrence model, they would do well by closely monitoring the actual
responses to changes in actual expected sanctions and rewards, while standing ready to respond
to their unexpected effects (Duflo 2017).
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Online Appendix
OA1 General Model
In this Online Appendix we prove that the results presented in the main text hold generally in the
model setup presented in Section (2.1), that is, if we relax all of the simplifying assumptions made
in Section (2.2). In addition, we generalize these results and provide additional technical insights.
OA1.1 The Model with Perfect Monitoring (p = 1).
We start by proving our results for the case in which the probability of monitoring is p = 1 and
later extend the analysis to p < 1. Given the setup in Section (2.1), an agent of type (b, e) anticipates
the payoffs reported below in Table OA1, which follows the same logic as Table 3 presented in the
main text.
Action Payoff
The agent participates and complies Πk (b, e) = b + qkc− (1− qk) s− e
The agent participates but violates Πv (b) = b + (1− qv) c− qvs
The agent does not participate 0
Table OA1: Agent’s payoffs
It is useful to begin the analysis by defining the following threshold level for b
bv ≡ qvs− (1− qv) c
which is the level of b such that Πv (b) = 0. Specifying this benefit threshold bv allows us to
partition the population of agents into two groups:
• High-benefit agents (with b > bv) participate in the activity irrespective of whether they com-
ply or violate. To see why, note that if b > bv, then Πv (b)> 0 and hence the payoff of violators
is positive. If the agent complies, he must also earn a positive payoff because he will com-
ply only if Πk (b, e) > Πv (b), and we know that the latter is positive. Overall, high-benefit
agents form the full participation group—they all take part in the activity. Whether the agent
complies or violates depends on his cost of effort e. More precisely, the agent will comply if
e < ek where the compliance threshold ek is
ek ≡ (c + s) (qk + qv − 1)
which is the level of e such that Πk (b, e) = Πv (b). The agent will violate if e ≥ ek. When the
compliance threshold controls, carrots and sticks are substitutes.
• Low-benefit agents (with b ≤ bv) participate in the activity only if they comply. To see why,
note that if b≤ bv, then Πv (b)≤ 0 and hence the payoff of violators is (weakly) negative. The
payoff for compliers may be positive or negative. Overall, low-benefit agents form the partial
participation group where all participants comply, all violators abstain from participation,
and some would-be compliers choose not to participate as well. A potential complier will
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participate only if Πk (b, e)> 0 at his level of e. More precisely, the agent will comply if e < ep
where the participation threshold ep is
ep (b) ≡ b + qkc− (1− qk) s
which is the level of e such that Πk (b, e) = 0. The agent will participate and comply if
e < ep (b) and will not participate if e ≥ ep (b). Note that for low-benefit agents, ep (b) con-
trols both compliance and participation because an agent who does not have incentives to
comply would earn a negative payoff by participating and violating. When the participation
threshold controls, carrots and sticks are complements.
In sum, ek is the compliance threshold for participants, which determines the choice between com-
plying and violating, on the assumption that the agent participates. This threshold controls the
agent’s compliance decision if b > bv, that is, in cases where both complying and violating agents
participate. In contrast, ep (b) is the participation threshold for complying agents. It controls be-
havior when b ≤ bv, that is, when violating agents do not find it advantageous to participate. In
this case, the alternative to compliance is abstention rather than violation.
Figure OA1: Agent’s behavior (simulation parameters: qk = qv = 34 , c = s =
1
2 ).
We impose no constraints on the possible benefits of heterogeneous agents in our model. There-
fore, some agents in our model belong to the full participation group while others belong to the
partial participation group. Figure OA1 characterizes the agents’ behavior. Quite intuitively,
agents with low costs of effort participate and comply. Those with large benefits and high ef-
fort costs participate but violate. The remaining agents (those with low benefits and high effort
costs) abstain from participation.
The next proposition shows how changes in enforcement variables affect the absolute number
of complying agents (“compliance”), the absolute number of violating agents (“violations”), over-
all participation (compliance plus violations), and the ratio of the number of compliers over the
number of participants (“compliance rate”). The results are summarized in Table OA3.
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Proposition 1. An increase in the carrot, c, results in an increase in compliance and participation, while
the effect on violations and the compliance rate is ambiguous. An increase in the stick, s, results in a decrease
in violations and participation, while the effect on compliance and the compliance rate is ambiguous.
Proof. First note the comparative statics results reported in Table OA2, which is trivial to verify.
The results on the effects of increased carrots on compliance and participation follow trivially from
Policy variable bv ek ep (b)
c Decrease Increase Increase
s Increase Increase Decrease
Table OA2: Comparative statics
the fact that ek and ep (b) increase in c, while bv decreases in c. The effect on violations is ambiguous
because the violation region shifts over different types as c increases, which in turn is due to the
fact that ek moves up and bv moves to the left (see Figure OA1). Hence, the result depends on
the relative frequency of those types in the population of agents, that is, on f (b, e). Formally, the



























To show that the sign of ∂V∂c is ambiguous is enough to show that there is a distribution f (b, e)
and parameter values that generate ambiguous results. Assume that b and e are independently




qk + qv − 1
1− qv
which proves the result.
Moving on to sticks, the results on violations and participation follow trivially from the fact
that ek and bv increase in v, while ep (b) decreases in s. The effect on compliance is ambiguous
because the compliance region shifts over different types as s increases because ek moves up and
bv moves to the right; hence the result depends on f (b, e). More formally, the absolute number of
















































where note that the first and the third line cancel each other out because ep (bv) = ek. As above,
assuming that b and e are independently and uniformly distributed on the unit interval, we have





qk + qv − 1
which again shows that the ambiguity arises.
Carrots and sticks have predictable effects on participation, which increases with carrots and
decreases with sticks. However, while carrots unambiguously increase compliance, they may or
may not reduce violations. The reason is that, by drawing more agents to the activity, carrots
also increase the payoff for those who choose to participate and violate the rule. Similarly, sticks
unambiguously reduce violations but may or may not increase compliance. This is because while
sticks induce some violators to comply, sticks also push some compliers away from the regulated
activity. The balance of these opposing effects depends on values of the various policy parameters.
(a) The ambiguous effect of carrots (from c = 12 to c
′





Figure OA2: Effects of an increase in the carrot or the stick (simulation parameters: qk = qv = 34 ,
c = s = 12 ).
Figure OA2 visualizes these results. An increase in the carrot pushes up both the compliance
and the participation thresholds but reduces the benefit threshold bv. As a result, the compliance
area expands, the no-participation area contracts (resulting in more participation), but the effect on
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the violation area is ambiguous. The increase in the compliance threshold induces some violators
to comply. The decrease in bv, however, enlarges the full participation group, causing some non-
participants to become violators. From a different perspective, as the threshold bv moves towards
the left, some agents that were labeled as low-benefit become high-benefit agents after the increase
in the carrot. In the main text, we refer to this effect as the inter-marginal effect of carrots.
Similarly, an increase in the stick increases ek and bv, but reduces ep (b). As a result, the violation
area contracts, the no-participation area expands (resulting in less participation), while the effect
on the compliance area is ambiguous. The increase in ek induces some violators to comply, while
the reduction in ep (b) leads some compliers to abstain from participation; in the main text, we
refer to this effect as the marginal effect of sticks.
Policy variable Compliance Violations Participation Compliance rate
c Increase Ambiguous Increase Ambiguous
s Ambiguous Decrease Decrease Ambiguous
Table OA3: Effects of an increase in the policy variables on compliance, violations, compliance
rate, and overall participation
OA1.2 The Model with Imperfect Monitoring (p < 1)
In the previous section, we assumed that the principal monitors each agent with certainty. Here,
we introduce imperfect monitoring (or auditing) in the model, p ∈ (0,1), thereby completing the
analysis of the general setup of Section (2.1). As a result of imperfect monitoring, agents who are
not monitored may—in the general case—receive a carrot with probability φc ≥ 0, a stick with
probability φs ≥ 0, or neither of the two with the residual probability 1− φc − φs ≥ 0.43
To illustrate, if φc = 1, then non-monitored agents receive a carrot with certainty. This case
corresponds to a subsidy given to agents who engage in the activity and are not inspected and
found in violation of the rule. Similarly, if φs = 1, then non-monitored agents are subject to a
stick with certainty. This amounts to taxing the activity unless the agent is inspected and found to
comply. Finally, if φc = φs = 0, then carrots and sticks are applied only to monitored agents. In the
general case, non-monitored agents may be taxed or subsidized with some probability.44
Action Payoff
The agent participates and complies Πk (b, e) = b + pqkc− p (1− qk) s− e + (1− p) (φcc− φss)
The agent participates but violates Πv (b) = b + p (1− qv) c− pqvs + (1− p) (φcc− φss)
The agent does not participate 0
Table OA4: Agent’s payoffs with imperfect monitoring
From the payoffs reported in Table OA4, we can calculate the relevant thresholds with imper-
43See Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2009) examining the incentive problems that arise from rewarding or punishing non-
monitored agents.
44In Section OA2 we examine the classical case of taxes and subsidies that are not conditional to the agent’s behavior, in
addition to (partially) conditional carrots and sticks.
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fect monitoring:
biv = p (qvs− (1− qv) c)− (1− p) (φcc− φss)
eik = p (c + s) (qk + qv − 1)
eip (b) = b + p (qkc− (1− qk) s) + (1− p) (φcc− φss)
Imperfect monitoring has two effects on the thresholds that we consider in the analysis. First,
for all thresholds, imperfect monitoring dilutes the effect of carrots and sticks proportionally to
the probability of monitoring p. Second, while the compliance threshold eik does not depend on
the treatment of non-monitored agents, the other two thresholds do. The factor (1− p) (φcc− φss)
is the net expected payment that non-monitored agents receive, which is positive if φcc > φss, that
is, if non-monitored agents are rewarded in expectation, and negative otherwise.
It is easy to verify that the expanded model including imperfect monitoring generates exactly
the same results as the basic model with respect to the effects considered there.
Proposition 2. Proposition 1 holds also with imperfect monitoring, p < 1.
Proof. The results follow from the comparative statics reported in Table OA5, to be compared
with Table OA2. Accordingly, we can easily derive Table OA6, which proves the proposition. In
Policy variable biv eik e
i
p (b)
c Decrease Increase Increase
s Increase Increase Decrease
Table OA5: Comparative statics
particular, this is true also in the realistic sub-case in which non-monitored agents receive a carrot
with certainty, that is, where φc = 1 and φs = 0.
Policy variable Compliance Violations Participation Compliance rate
c Increase Ambiguous Increase Ambiguous
s Ambiguous Decrease Decrease Ambiguous
p Ambiguous Ambiguous Ambiguous Ambiguous
Table OA6: Effects of an increase in the policy variables on compliance, violations, compliance rate
and overall participation with imperfect monitoring
OA2 Taxes and Subsidies
Let us now examine whether adding a tax to the model expands the set of outcomes that the
principal can reach. This section generalizes the results illustrated in Section 3. The new payoff
matrix is given in Table OA7.
We have now the following thresholds:
bτv = p (qvs− (1− qv) c)− (1− p) (φcc− φss)− τ
eτk = p (c + s) (qk + qv − 1)
eτp (b) = b + p (qkc− (1− qk) s) + (1− p) (φcc− φss) + τ
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Action Payoff
The agent participates and complies Πk (b, e) = b + pqkc− p (1− qk) s− e + (1− p) (φcc− φss) + τ
The agent participates but violates Πv (b) = b + p (1− qv) c− pqvs + (1− p) (φcc− φss) + τ
The agent does not participate 0
Table OA7: Agent’s payoffs with imperfect monitoring and taxes / subsidies
Clearly the compliance threshold is unaffected by τ, because every participant receives τ whether
he complies or not. In contrast, participation will be incentivized by τ, both for compliers and for
violators, since τ reduces bτv and increases eτp (b). The addition of τ, however, does not expand the
set of outcomes that the principal can reach. To see why, consider that the principal could replicate
the same compliance and participation thresholds as above by simply adjusting the carrot and the
stick instead of implementing a tax or a subsidy. In short, the principal can replicate the effects of
taxes and subsidies by keeping the sum of the carrot and the stick constant (so as to keep the com-
pliance threshold constant) while altering their ratio cs . That ratio should increase if the activity
is subsidized (that is, if τ is positive) and decrease if the activity is taxed (that is, if τ is negative),
leading to the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Complementing carrots and sticks with a tax or a subsidy on the regulated activity does not
affect any of the results; the principal can replicate the effect of any tax or subsidy, τ, by setting c′ = c + T
and s
′
= s− T where:
T =
τ
p + (1− p) (φc + φs)
Proof. Let c
′
= c + T and s
′
= s− T. It is easy to see that c′ + s′ = c + s and hence eik = e
τ
k . Note also
that the value of T that guarantees that biv = bτv also necessarily yields eip (b) = eτp (b). To derive the















= p (qvs− (1− qv) c)− (1− p) (φcc− φss)− τ
⇐⇒
p (qvs− (1− qv) c)− (1− p) (φcc− φss)
−pT − (1− p) (φc + φs)T = p (qvs− (1− qv) c)− (1− p) (φcc− φss)− τ
⇐⇒
T (p + (1− p) (φc + φs)) = τ
which yields the result.
Note that if monitoring is perfect (p = 1) then T = τ. Even if monitoring is imperfect (p < 1)
we still have T = τ if φc + φs = 1, that is, if non-monitored agents are always either rewarded or
punished. The common case where all unmonitored participants receive a carrot is one particular
example when this condition is met. In the general case, the adjustment to the ratio of carrots and
sticks needs to account for the treatment of non-monitored agents. The intuition is that, if there is
a positive probability that a non-monitored agent is subject neither to a carrot nor to a stick, that
agent fails to be compensated for the effect of the tax or subsidy and hence the correction on the
carrot and the stick needs to take that eventuality into account.
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OA3 Agents’ Perceptions of Accuracy
Here we consider an alternative model where all agents have a benefit of participation b = 0.
Agent’s, however, vary in their perception of the accuracy of enforcement by the principal so that
the three-dimensional agent type is (e,qk,qv), distributed according to f (e,qk,qv). To elaborate:
each agent has an idiosyncratic perception of the accuracy of enforcement, which is distributed






and may or may not correlated with the agent’s costs
of effort e. We will show that all the results obtained in the basic setup are confirmed in this
alternative setup. The agents’ payoffs are reported in TableOA8
Action Payoff
The agent participates and complies Πk (e,qk) = qkc− (1− qk) s− e
The agent participates but violates Πv (qv) = (1− qv) c− qvs
The agent does not participate 0
Table OA8: Agent’s payoffs
As in the basic model, we can define three thresholds:
q̂v ≡ cc+s
ek (qk,qv) ≡ (c + s) (qk + qv − 1)
ep (qk) ≡ qkc− (1− qk) s
The threshold q̂v is the level of an agent’s perception of the enforcement accuracy, qv, that makes
the agent indifferent between violation and abstention, that is, such that Πv (qv) = 0. This thresh-
old is analogous to the threshold bv in the basic model and partitions the agent’s population into
two groups: the full-participation group, with qv < q̂v—whose compliance decision is controlled
by the compliance threshold ek (qk,qv)—and the partial-participation group, with qv ≥ q̂v—whose
compliance decision is controlled by the participation threshold ep (qk).
If c > s, we have 12 < q̂v < 1. In this case, the threshold q̂v lies in the interval of admissible
values for qv. This implies that, stochastically, some agents are in the full-participation group and
others are in the partial-participation group. If instead c ≤ s, then q̂v ≤ 12 and hence all agents
are in the group with qv > q̂v, that is, all agents are in the partial-participation group and either
participate and comply or stay away from the regulated activity. Figure OA3 illustrates how agents
of different types behave when c > s.
We are interested in establishing the expected levels of compliance and participation in the
population. We start by summarizing the comparative statics of the thresholds of interest in Table
OA9.
Policy variables q̂v ek (qk,qv) ep (qk)
c Increase Increase Increase
s Decrease Increase Decrease
Table OA9: Comparative statics
Accordingly, we can derive the results in Table OA10, which are in accordance with those
obtained in the basic model.
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Figure OA3: Agent’s behavior (simulation parameters: qk = 34 , c =
3
4 , s =
1
4 ).
Policy variable Compliance Violations Participation Compliance rate
c Increase Ambiguous Increase Ambiguous
s Ambiguous Decrease Decrease Ambiguous
Table OA10: Effects of an increase in the policy variables on compliance, violations, and overall
participation with imperfect monitoring.
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